Security

Your servers, read plainly.

Sign-ins, hardening, vulnerabilities, exposure and changes, from the agent you already run. Every finding comes with why it matters and the fix for your OS.

Security · acme-co31119
Host · worst firstOSFindingsSeen
web-1Ubuntu 20.04EOL24612s
db-1Rocky Linux 91359s
web-2Ubuntu 22.0403414s
worker-1Debian 1201411s
Latest
secNew SSH key for deploy@web-1authorized_keys
highopenssl 3.0.2 · 1 high CVEweb-1
secNew listening port 6379db-1 · 0.0.0.0
How it works

Read on the host. Decide on errorgap.

01 · Read

The agent reads the host

Config, keys, packages and listening ports, on the same errorgap-agent that ships logs and metrics.

02 · Derive

Rules run on errorgap

Not on the host, so rules update without an agent release.

03 · Explain

Severity, evidence, fix

Each finding carries the lines it was read from and fix commands per distro: Ubuntu/Debian or RHEL family.

04 · Alert

The changes that matter

High findings, new SSH keys, file changes and new ports raise alerts.

What it covers

Six views of one host.

Sign-ins

Who got in, and from where.

SSH and web sign-ins on one timeline. Web sign-ins arrive through the SDKs you already send errors with.

  • New-country and unusual-hour detection
  • Shared-account detection
  • Expected-login rules to quiet the known ones
Sign-ins · last 24hSSH + web
TimeUserViaFromFlags
03:12anassh · keyPTNew countryOdd hour
09:40deployssh · keyDEShared account
10:02anaweb · sdkGBExpected
11:18rootssh · passwordNLRoot login
11:31deployssh · keyDEExpected
Findings

Findings with the fix.

A finding panel shows the evidence lines, a path-to-root chain for sudo, and fix commands for your distro. If a finding is intentional, accept it with a reason; the acceptance is audit-logged.

  • Evidence lines from the file that triggered it
  • Ubuntu / RHEL fix tabs
  • Accept with a reason, audit-logged
HIGHFinding · db-1sudo
deploy can reach root through sudo
A NOPASSWD rule lets deploy run an editor as root. Editors can open a shell, so this is a path to root.
Path to root
deploy→sudo NOPASSWD→/usr/bin/vim→root shell
Evidence
/etc/sudoers.d/90-deploy:1 deploy ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/vim
Fix
Ubuntu / DebianRHEL family
# limit deploy to the service it restarts sudo visudo -f /etc/sudoers.d/90-deploy # deploy ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl restart app
Accept with a reason…Explain for this host
Vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities and end of life.

Installed packages matched against OSV, with severity and the version that fixes each one. An end-of-life banner appears when the OS itself stops getting updates.

  • OSV matching per installed package
  • Fixed-in version per advisory
  • OS end-of-life banner
Vulnerabilities · web-1OSV · 412 packages
End of lifeUbuntu 20.04 standard support has ended. Packages no longer get routine security fixes.
PackageInstalledSeverityFixed in
openssl3.0.2high3.0.13
libcurl47.81.0med7.81.0-1u16
sudo1.9.9med1.9.9-1u5
libxml22.9.13low2.9.14
Exposure

What’s listening, and who can reach it.

Listening sockets with the process and container behind them, firewall state, and a history of ports that opened or closed.

  • Process and container per socket
  • Firewall state per host
  • Port-change history
Exposure · db-1ufw active
PortBoundProcessContainerFW
22/tcp0.0.0.0sshd—allow
5432/tcp127.0.0.1postgres—local
6379/tcp0.0.0.0redis-servernewcacheopen
9100/tcp10.0.0.4node_exporter—allow
Port changes
Oct 06 14:20 + 6379/tcp redis-server · container cache
Oct 02 09:11 − 8080/tcp python3
Changes

Watched files, diffed.

sshd_config, sudoers, authorized_keys and the rest of the watch list, diffed with a plain summary. Secrets are masked on the host before anything is sent. Sign-ins and deploys near the change are shown as possibly related.

  • Plain-English summary per diff
  • Secrets masked on the host
  • Nearby sign-ins and deploys linked
CHANGE/etc/ssh/sshd_config · web-114:02
Password sign-in was turned back on for SSH.
38PermitRootLogin no
39−PasswordAuthentication no
39+PasswordAuthentication yes
40PubkeyAuthentication yes
52+# token •••• masked on host
Possibly related
Explain for this host

A plain-English read, scoped to the OS.

One click for an explanation of a finding written for this host’s distro and setup. It sits beside the deterministic fix and never replaces it.

  • Runs on an errorgap-run model
  • Prompts are redacted first
  • Included on Team and above, with a daily allowance
AIExplain for this hostUbuntu 22.04
On web-2, password sign-in is enabled and port 22 is open to the internet, so anyone can try passwords against your accounts. Because deploy and ana both sign in with keys, turning passwords off won't lock either of them out. Ubuntu 22.04 reads drop-in files from sshd_config.d/ first, so check there before editing the main file.
Deterministic fix · unchanged
sudo sed -i 's/^PasswordAuthentication yes/PasswordAuthentication no/' …
errorgap-run model · prompt redacted first
Privacy

What leaves the host, and when.

Secrets masked on the host

Tokens and passwords in watched files are replaced before the agent sends anything.

Key blobs shortened

SSH keys are reported as fingerprint, type and comment, with the key itself shortened.

Contents only on change

File contents are sent when a watched file changes, not on every snapshot.

Silent baseline

The first snapshot sets the baseline without raising alerts, so installing the agent doesn’t cause an alert storm.

Limitationserrorgap reports and explains; it doesn’t block, patch or quarantine.

Close the errorgap.

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